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Climate-induced population displacements
in a 4◦C+ world
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Institute for Sustainable Development and International Relations (IDDRI ),
Sciences Po Paris, 27 Rue Saint-Guillaume, 75007 Paris, France
Massive population displacements are now regularly forecast as one of the most dramatic
possible consequences of climate change. Current forecasts and projections show that
regions that would be affected by such population movements are low-lying islands,
coastal and delta regions, as well as sub-Saharan Africa. Such estimates, however, are
usually based on a 2◦C temperature rise. In the event of a 4◦C+ warming, not only
is it likely that climate-induced population movements will be more considerable, but
their patterns could also be signiﬁcantly different as people might react differently to
temperature changes that would represent a threat to their very survival. This paper
puts forward the hypothesis that a greater temperature change would not only affect
the magnitude of the associated population movements, but also—and above all—the
characteristics of these movements, and therefore the policy responses that can address
them. The paper outlines the policy evolutions that climate-induced displacements in a
4◦C+ world would require.
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1. Introduction
Massive population displacements are regularly forecast as one of the most
dramatic possible consequences of climate change. In recent years, the concept
of climate-induced migration has gained considerable currency, and ‘climate
refugees’ are now a common feature in discourse on the human impact of climate
change [1,2]. Works on this topic are rooted in an essentialist perspective which
assumes that migration is a logical by-product of climate change. Most forecasts
and estimations adopt a deterministic approach based on the number of people
living in regions that will be affected by sea-level rise, and conclude that about
150–200 million people could be displaced by 2050 as a result of climate change
[3–5]. Such forecasts, however, triggered wide controversy among the scholarly
community, and were often criticized for being too environmentally deterministic
and not sufﬁciently rooted in empirical evidence [6,7]. Indeed, such forecasts took
little account of vulnerability patterns and demographic trends, and did not factor
in the development of possible adaptation strategies.
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This paper contends that the nature and extent of migration ﬂows associated
with the impacts of climate change depend not only on these impacts, but
also on a wide range of other factors, such as cultural, economic or political
conditions. This paper argues that the policy responses that will be implemented
to deal with these ﬂows will be particularly important in that regard. Migration
policies, so far, have poorly accounted for environmental drivers of migration,
but the policy debate on adaptation is increasingly considering that migration
could be a way for populations to cope with environmental degradation,
rather than being seen as a failure to adapt [8–10]. The planning of future
adaptation policies that would address migration, however, is contingent upon
predictions and forecasts of future population movements. Current forecasts
and projections show that the regions that would be most affected by such
population movements are low-lying islands, coastal and delta regions, as well
as sub-Saharan Africa [5,11]. Such estimates, however, are usually based on a
2◦C temperature rise. In the event of a 4◦C+ average temperature rise, this
paper argues that the very nature of these migrations, rather than just their
magnitude, would change and would therefore call for different policy responses.
It puts forward the hypothesis that a greater temperature change would not only
affect the magnitude of associated population movements, but also—and more
importantly—the characteristics of these movements, and therefore the policy
responses that can address them.
Section 2 reviews the different impacts of climate change that could trigger
population displacements. Such impacts typically include sea-level rise, droughts
and land degradation, as well as extreme weather events. Predictions and
forecasts of population displacements related to these impacts, however, are
marred by a double uncertainty, which concerns both the local impacts of
climate change and the way people will respond to these changes. Despite these
uncertainties, §3 attempts to examine how a temperature rise of 4◦C+ could affect
population displacements. Using past empirical evidence, the section suggests
that people might migrate very differently in a 4◦C+ world than in a 2◦C world.
Three expected changes in particular are highlighted, in a way that rebuts the
deterministic perspective that dominates discourse on ‘environmental migration’.
Finally, §§4 and 5 outline the policy implications of this rebuttal and elaborate on
some proposals for policy developments that could address the changing nature
of climate-induced displacements in a 4◦C+ world.
2. The impacts of climate change on migration
Climate change will affect societies through an extensive range of impacts. The
prediction of such impacts, however, remains marred by uncertainties, especially
at the regional and local levels [12,13]. Uncertainties are even greater when one
needs to factor in the wide range of possible human reactions to these impacts.
Empirical studies remain scarce [6], and experimentation is impossible, as is often
the case in social sciences. Thus an assessment of the impacts of climate change
on migration is, by nature, a daunting task. It nevertheless appears possible to
identify three types of impacts that seem most likely to have an effect on migration
patterns, although these effects are not certain [11,14].



















































Climate-induced population displacements 3
(a) Extreme weather events
Extreme weather events include heat waves, tropical cyclones, droughts and
Q1
ﬂooding. The latest IPCC report predicts, by the end of this century, a ‘very likely
increase in hot extremes, heat waves and heavy precipitation’, a ‘likely increase
in tropical cyclone activity’, with ‘less conﬁdence in the decrease of tropical
cyclones’, as well as ‘very likely precipitation increases in high latitudes and likely
decreases in most subtropical land regions’ [15]. In addition, it is expected that
annual run-off and precipitation will increase in high latitudes, whereas water
resources will decrease in mid-latitudes and in the tropics, as well as in arid
regions. The IPCC notes that both the increase in droughts and tropical cyclone
activity present a potential for population migration [16].
The latter claim, however, can be disputed, as the impacts of extreme weather
events on migration ﬂows are diverse and sometimes controversial. Disasters can
indeed result in highly diverse patterns of migration. For example, it is widely
thought that disasters are more likely to induce temporary migration, allowing
people to return home once the danger is gone. As a result of this assumption,
people forced to ﬂee to another country because of a disaster were often granted
temporary protection status: for example, a temporary protection status in the
USA was granted to the people of Montserrat displaced by a volcanic eruption
in 1997, and to the people of Honduras and Nicaragua displaced by Hurricane
Mitch in 1998. The experience of Hurricane Katrina, however, showed that people
displaced by natural disasters were not always able to go home, as a signiﬁcant
proportion of the population of New Orleans has still not returned, and seems
unlikely to do so in the future [17]. It is now increasingly acknowledged that
disasters result in both temporary and permanent migration, as well as in both
proactive and reactive migration.
It is likely that an increase in extreme weather events will result in an increase
in the number of natural disasters [18]. This would reinforce the upward trend in
the occurrence of disasters, identiﬁed since the start of their systematic recording
in the early twentieth century [19]. Until now, this upward trend has been
primarily explained by the increased vulnerability of the affected populations. A
disaster occurs when natural risk meets vulnerability [20]: if the number of natural
risks increases with a temperature rise, the number of disasters will consequently
increase unless the vulnerability of populations can be reduced. Unless robust
adaptation strategies are implemented, there is no sign that vulnerability might
decrease in a near future. In a 4◦C+ world, however, the main driver of natural
disasters might shift from an increase in vulnerability to an increase in the number
and severity of natural events. In addition, the characteristics of these events
themselves might change, as different hazards could combine with each other in
an unprecedented setting. This could affect both the location of disasters and the
design and implementation of disaster-reduction policies.
(b) Sea-level rise
The most obvious consequence of climate change with regard to environmental
migration is probably the sea-level rise. Though sea-level rise will not be uniform
across the globe, most studies agree that the rise will be about 1m by the end of
the century [21,22]. The IPCC notes that




















































Many millions more people are projected to be ﬂooded every year due to sea-level rise by the
2080s. Those densely-populated and low-lying areas where adaptive capacity is relatively low,
and which already face other challenges such as tropical storms or local coastal subsidence, are
especially at risk. The numbers affected will be largest in the mega-deltas of Asia and AfricaQ2
while small islands are especially vulnerable. Intergovermental Panel on climate change [23].
Unlike extreme weather events, sea-level rise is more predictable if longer
term, and populations at risk can be more easily identiﬁed, thus facilitating
the implementation of adaptation plans. Given that coastal and delta areas are
usually very densely populated, the potential for large numbers of migrants is
particularly high [24,25].
The projection of a 1m sea-level rise is usually based on a 2◦C average
temperature increase. In a world with a 4◦C+ temperature increase, sea-level
rise would be higher, especially with the increased probability of the deglaciation
of the Greenland and West Antarctic ice sheets [26]. Sea-level rise would also
induce greater coastal erosion, as well as bigger storm surges. The El Niño-
Southern Oscillation could also be affected, magnifying the differences in local
sea-level rises. It is especially important to understand and forecast local sea-
level rises, as the migration potential associated with this rise depends on the
local rather than the average sea-level rise. In that regard, a 4◦C+ temperature
increase would not only increase the average sea-level rise, but also—and probably
more importantly—the uncertainties associated with the migration potential. For
example, population retreat from the coasts might be increasingly considered as
an alternative to migration.
(c)Water stress
Water stress will be caused by a series of cumulative factors: droughts,
salt water intrusion owing to sea-level rise, and also the melting of mountain
glaciers in the long run. The IPCC forecasts that ‘freshwater availability in
Central, South, East and southeast Asia, particularly in large river basins,
is projected to decrease due to climate change which, along with population
growth and increasing demand arising from higher standards of living, could
adversely affect more than a billion people by the 2050s’ [23]. The water
supplies stored in glaciers and snow cover are also expected to decline, reducing
freshwater availability in regions supplied by melt-water from mountain ranges.
The situation is expected to be most difﬁcult in Africa, where an estimated 75
million to 250 million people will be at risk of water stress owing to climate
change by 2020. Given that this water stress will be associated with higher
demand, especially in big cities, water-related problems are very likely to be
exacerbated [27].
The effects of water stress on migration patterns remain heavily contested:
some authors argue that droughts and desertiﬁcation are a major push factor
for migration [28,29],1 while others contend that people affected by droughts
1Hammer [28] argues that one million people were displaced as a result of the 1985 drought in
Niger, and that ‘hundreds of thousands of people from rural Sahel regions are displaced every year
as a consequence of environmental change and desertiﬁcation’; Leighton [29] makes a similar case
for Northeast Brazil.



















































Climate-induced population displacements 5
have a choice between different coping strategies, including migration, and
note that international migration actually decreases during these periods [6].
In a recent review of empirical case studies conducted in Africa, Jonsson
asserts that ‘environmental stressors such as droughts do not necessarily lead
to migration’ [30]. In any case, the nexus between drought and migration is
not straightforward and depends on a wide range of factors [31]. Findings
from the EACH-FOR project,2 for example, conﬁrm that water stress can
affect migration patterns in different directions: Van der Geest [32] found that
contemporary North–South migration in Ghana was environmentally motivated,
but decreased during the worst droughts; Aﬁﬁ [33] also identiﬁed droughts as an
important push factor that inﬂuences both internal and international migration
in Niger.
Here again, a larger temperature increase towards 4◦C would further exacerbate
problems of water stress, and would also increase uncertainties: the impact
of aggravated water stress on human mobility remains unclear and poorly
documented. According to the case and the wider context, it could result in
different mobility patterns, with an increase in some regions and a decrease
in others. In the Sahel, Jonsson observes that ‘whether and how people migrate
in response to environmental change depends largely upon the role that mobility
already plays in their lives and livelihoods’ [30]. Q2
The impacts of climate change in a 4◦C+ world are difﬁcult to translate
into migration forecasts: increased temperatures might have different effects on
migration ﬂows, and it is impossible to conduct experimentation in this ﬁeld to
adjust the forecasts.
Historically, migration models have done a very poor job of accounting for
environmental factors in the migration decision [34], and it is only recently that
migration research has started to consider environmental changes as possible
migration drivers. Hence, it is not possible to refer to explanatory models in order
to predict the nature and the extent of the migratory movements that could be
associated with climate change impacts.
We are thus faced with a double level of uncertainty: the ﬁrst level deals with
uncertainties related to climate impacts on local and regional scales; whereas
the second level concerns the way humans will react to environmental changes.
Such uncertainties are even greater in the event where the average global
temperature would rise by 4◦C and beyond. The ﬁrst level of uncertainty can
be reduced with more precise climate models, but the second level cannot yet
be reduced because current migration models do not account for environmental
drivers. The only tool we have at our disposal is to look at how environmental
changes have affected migration behaviours in the past. This does not imply
that humans will react in the same way to future environmental changes: these
changes will be accompanied by other social, cultural and economic changes and
transformations that will also inﬂuence migration behaviours. Past empirical
evidence is not especially helpful in predicting future migration ﬂows, but can
nevertheless be used to show some trends that are likely to occur under a 4◦C+
global warming.
2EACH-FOR stands for Environmental Change and Forced Migration Scenarios, an empirical
research project funded by the European Commission between 2007 and 2009. See
http://www.each-for.eu for more details.




















































3. Implications for a 4◦C+ world
Given that the uncertainties associated with a 2◦C temperature rise, an
assessment of climate-induced displacements in a 4◦C+ world is a very tricky
task. Though empirical evidence cannot predict future population displacements,
it suggests that in a 4◦C+ world, people might move in a very different way than
in a 2◦C world: the very nature of the displacements might be affected more than
just their magnitude. Three changes in particular can be expected.
As shown in §2, a 4◦C+ world could result in increased environmental pressure
on migration. Empirical research shows that mobility is often one possible option
among different coping strategies to deal with environmental disruption. Over the
years, people have developed traditional mobility patterns that allow them to cope
with environmental changes, especially when these changes affect agricultural
yields or livestock herds. For some people, mobility is an integral part of their
livelihood, which allows them to increase, diversify or secure their incomes.
Such traditional coping strategies are jeopardized by increased environmental
pressure owing to climate change [35,36]. As environmental disruptions would
be exacerbated with a 4◦C+ temperature increase, mobility might become a
less-viable coping strategy.
For example, Van der Geest [36] observes that traditional nomadic patterns,
which were used by pastoralists to cope with droughts, have been modiﬁed owing
to rapidly changing environmental and socio-economic conditions. A similar
phenomenon is observed in Bangladesh, where the traditional movement of
people from char to char3 is disrupted by ﬂash ﬂoods that are more violent
and frequent than they used to be [37]. Thus, it appears that if the impacts
of climate change become more severe, they could disrupt traditional patterns
of mobility and people might need to leave their usual place of residence.
Migration options would become more limited. In that case, it is expected that
the movement would most likely be a long-term or permanent migration instead
of a temporary displacement—a trend that has been observed by the EACH-
FOR project in different countries of southeast Asia and sub-Saharan Africa
(most notably Ghana, Vietnam and Bangladesh). In Vietnam, for example, rice
farmers usually undertake seasonal labour migration to urban centres during the
ﬂooding season, in order to increase and diversify their incomes. Successive ﬂoods,
however, leading to the destruction of crops, have prompted farmers to migrate
permanently in search of a new livelihood [38,39].
Permanent dislocation affects the ability of migrants to cope and adapt in
the destination region, but might also affect the rights and protection they are
entitled to, especially in the case of forced migration abroad, as no international
protection regime exists for those displaced by environmental changes. Though
the distinction between forced and voluntary migration is increasingly blurred [40]
and probably no longer ﬁt to describe the realities of contemporary migration, it
remains a deﬁning element of migration policies and law.
Climate change is expected to further blur this distinction, as environmental
changes not only threaten the lives of people, but also their livelihoods [41].
Hence, people moving as a result of climate change impacts might do so both
because their life is at risk and because they can no longer sustain their
3A char is a temporary sandy island that forms in the bed of a river.



















































Climate-induced population displacements 7
household. In a 4◦C+ world, where environmental pressure to migrate could be
higher, traditional patterns of mobility might be deeply affected: an increasing
number of people could be deprived of the choice to leave or to stay and feel
forced to move.
However, not everyone moves when confronted with environmental changes.
Another consequence of a temperature rise of 4◦C+ might be, paradoxically
and in some cases, a decrease in the number of people on the move. Numerous
studies show that migration ﬂows tend to decrease when environmental crises
peak. This is especially true in the case of droughts, as people tend to allocate
their income primarily to meet their household’s basic needs rather than to
moving [6,36]. People will move only if they have the resources that allow them
to do so: this includes ﬁnancial resources—moving is a costly process—but also
access to social networks facilitating mobility. Furthermore, empirical evidence
shows that the most vulnerable are often unable to move when faced with an
environmental crisis. For example, prior to Hurricane Katrina, about 60 000
people were unable to leave the city of New Orleans: evacuation required money
for food, gas and lodging, and many poor families were unable to afford the
expense. Furthermore, the hurricane struck at the end of the month: many of the
poorest residents were awaiting paychecks, leaving even fewer resources available
for their evacuation [42].
If vulnerability and poverty increase in some regions, as has been the case in
recent decades,4 one might expect that the number of people who would ﬁnd
themselves unable to move in the event of an environmental crisis would also be
on the rise. An increasing number of people might thus ﬁnd themselves forced
to stay.
Finally, climate change-induced migration in a 4◦C+ world is not expected
to become more international, as often assumed. Apart from some speciﬁc
cases of migration from small island states, discussed in §4, movements are
expected to remain conﬁned within the borders of states affected by the
impacts of climate change, unless signiﬁcant policy changes occur. No empirical
evidence suggests that the distance of migration increases in relation to the
magnitude of environmental disruption. Empirical ﬁndings from the EACH-FOR
project reveal that the overwhelming majority of migration ﬂows observed in
relation to environmental changes are internal movements, often over very short
distances [38].
Furthermore, international migration requires considerable ﬁnancial resources
for the migrants: unless signiﬁcant ﬁnancial transfers are made or developing
countries undergo rapid economic development, these resources are unlikely to be
available. In addition, policy developments with regard to international migration
since the late 1970s point towards a restriction of international mobility, rather
than an opening of borders. This trend is observed in both the North and the
South, as exempliﬁed by the recent building of a security barrier at the border
between India and Bangladesh [37]. The barrier is supposed to protect India
against intrusion by Islamist militants from Bangladesh, as well as smuggling
and illegal immigration. Bangladesh also ranks among the countries that are
4Research dealing with the increase in natural disasters over the past few decades suggests that
the key driving force behind this rise is the increased vulnerability of populations, rather than a
higher number of natural hazards [24].




















































the most vulnerable to climate change impacts. In the event of climate-induced
displacements from Bangladesh, the barrier would also, most likely, serve as a
deterrent to prevent these migrants from entering India.
In a nutshell, the effects of a 4◦C+ temperature rise on migration ﬂows remain
difﬁcult to assess. The linkages between environmental changes and mobility
cannot be explained through a linear, deterministic relationship, though many
discourses on this issue remain rooted in an essentialist perspective. Empirical
research has shown that responses to environmental changes vary according to
a wide set of factors and are context-speciﬁc: this makes it difﬁcult—if not
impossible—to design a general predictive model of climate-induced displacement.
Furthermore, a global warming of 4◦C+ will bring unprecedented changes, which
will make them difﬁcult to compare with changes experienced by populations in
the past. These changes will also, most likely, be accompanied by other changes
and transformations of societies. These economic, cultural, technological or
political changes might translate into opportunities or constraints for migration,
and are in any case expected to affect mobility patterns. We should not assume,
however, that climate change impacts will simply act as ‘push’ factors of
migration. Migration theories have widely rebutted the ‘push and pull’ model as
unﬁt to account for contemporary migration, and have shown the complex and
nonlinear processes governing migration dynamics [43–45]. Climate change will
most probably be an increasingly important element of these migration dynamics,
but should not be considered independently of other changes and variables,
as is too often the case in deterministic arguments linking climate change and
migration in a direct, causal relationship.
So far, no migration theory has properly accounted for the effects of climate
change, let alone a 4◦C+ warming. Yet, some likely trends can be identiﬁed
through a comparative assessment of empirical evidence. Traditional patterns
of mobility could be disrupted, and an increasing number of migrants might
feel deprived of a choice in their migration decision. At the same time, some
people, especially the most vulnerable, might ﬁnd themselves unable to move,
lacking the resources to do so. Population movements associated with climate
change impacts are expected to take place mostly at the internal domestic
level, over short distances, and eventually on a permanent basis. Overall, it
appears that the most signiﬁcant impact of a 4◦C+ warming on migration
would be to reduce populations’ ability to move on their own terms, as many
people would no longer have the choice to stay or to leave when confronted
with environmental changes. This ability, or ‘right to choose’, however, will be
highly dependent upon the policy responses that will be designed to address
climate-induced displacements.
4. Policy implications
Historically, migration policies have often neglected environmental factors as
drivers of migration. Environmental policies, on the other hand, have usually
considered migration as a humanitarian issue resulting from natural disasters
or other environmental disruptions [46]. Current debates on future policy
developments tend to rely on the deterministic assumptions outlined in §2:
migration is considered as a dramatic and unavoidable consequence of climate



















































Climate-induced population displacements 9
change impacts, with little account of people’s agency and ability to respond. As a
result, most policy discussions revolve around issues of protection and security
rather than of governance and mobility.
As no international regime exists to assist those displaced by climate change,
many policy proposals have recommended that a new convention or treaty be
drafted to ﬁll in this gap in international law [47,48]. Most of the debates
have focused on the international status that could be granted to the displaced,
with many authors lamenting that the 1951 Geneva Convention Relating to the
Status of Refugees does not apply to those displaced by environmental events
[47,49]. An international status, however, would be inapplicable in most cases
of climate-induced displacements, as these are primarily internal movements,
beyond the reach of an international status. Despite this fact, various legislative
proposals have been made in different parliaments, including those of Australia
and Belgium, with the aim of establishing an international status for ‘climate
change refugees’. Overall, the issue remains framed in either a security agenda or
a humanitarian one.
As described earlier, in a 4◦C+ world, the adaptive capacities of many
regions are likely to be overwhelmed by the impacts of climate change. Policy
responses would therefore be crucial to enhance the migration options of those
affected by the impacts. Yet, it appears that the current policy directions
and development proposals remain rooted in a deterministic and international
perspective, and take little account of empirical evidence. These policies would
therefore be inadequate in the face of the greater and different migratory pressures
in a 4◦C+ world. In particular, this paper contends that policies should be
more focused on assisting migration, both internal and cross-border, rather
than on its limitation. In order to achieve this goal, we would need different
policy agendas.
(a) Fostering the right to mobility
As adaptation strategies will be a key element of the ﬁght against climate
change in a 4◦C+ world, policy responses would need, in particular, to promote
the right to mobility, as migration can be an efﬁcient adaptation strategy
and traditional patterns of mobility in relation to environmental changes will
most probably be deeply disrupted. Migration, in many cases, would need
to be encouraged rather than avoided. Migration would have to become a
core element of the affected populations’ adaptive capacity, rather than a
symptom of adaptation failure. This would also imply that the current security
agenda be replaced by an adaptation agenda with regard to mobility. From a
policy viewpoint, fostering the right to mobility with regard to climate change
impacts means two things. First, barriers to migration remain considerable in
many parts of the world, including at the internal level. These barriers would
need to be lifted for migration to unleash its full potential as an adaptation
strategy. Second, the most vulnerable often lack the resources to migrate. As
environmental crises will become more frequent and more severe, it is likely
that households’ resources will not be available for migration, but would be
used instead to meet the households’ primary needs. Transfers of resources
will therefore be needed in order to foster the right to mobility for the most
vulnerable. The ﬁnancial burden of migration could be met through adaptation




















































funding, provided this funding includes a provision for migration. In a 4◦C+
world, if the most vulnerable are not enabled to move to safer places, they
will ﬁnd themselves directly at risk of climate change impacts with tragic
humanitarian implications.
In that regard, the issue of proactive displacements is not an easy one. Some
governments, such as those of China and Mozambique, have started displacing
their populations in anticipation of climate change impacts. These populations
need to be provided with adequate compensation, and human rights, including
the right to choose one’s destination, should be a policy priority. In any case,
people should not be displaced against their will, and education and information
about climate change impacts need to be improved.
(b) Adaptation in the destination regions
Adaptation remains largely envisioned as a way to prevent displacement
in the regions of origin. Adaptation will also be needed, however, in the
regions of destination. These regions will be faced with additional inﬂuxes of
population. They will therefore need to adapt to both climate change impacts
and higher demographic pressures, especially if they are already highly populated.
If adaptation policies are not also directed at destination regions, these regions
might ﬁnd themselves unable to meet the needs of their populations. Normal
emergency humanitarian aid will be insufﬁcient to meet these requirements, as
migrants will also need to be provided with jobs, housing, schools, etc. After
Hurricane Katrina, the city of Houston welcomed an estimated 150 000–200 000
displaced residents from Louisiana. They were provided with emergency supplies
and housing, as the authorities of Houston expected them to return home within
a couple of weeks. It took several months, however, before residents could return
to New Orleans, and many decided to resettle in Houston and in the region. The
city of Houston, however, experienced a surge in crime, drug use and racism
as a result of its inability to provide many of the displaced with jobs and
long-term housing.
The humanitarian agenda will therefore need to shift towards a development
agenda, as population movements are expected to become increasingly long-
term and permanent displacements. Migrants should not be considered as
resourceless victims, but should be empowered in order to develop their adaptive
capacities once in the destination region. The current deterministic perspective,
however, continues to envision them as ‘refugees’, a label that could hinder
their resilience and resourcefulness, ultimately impeding their resettlement in the
destination region.
(c) Protection and assistance
As noted earlier, those displaced by climate change are not entitled to any kind
of international protection or assistance. No international organization or UN
agency has a mandate to deal with environmental displacement, though both the
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and the International
Organization for Migration (IOM) now intervene regularly in situations of natural
disasters to provide humanitarian assistance to the displaced. As forced migration
worldwide would most probably increase as a result of a 4◦C+ temperature
increase, adequate mechanisms of protection and assistance will be needed to



















































Climate-induced population displacements 11
assist those forcibly displaced. Such mechanisms are already required today—the
need for them would only be further reinforced in a 4◦C+ world—as discussed by
other authors [47,50].
(d) Statelessness
Statelessness, deﬁned by the UNHCR as the condition of a person not
considered as a national by any state under the operation of its law, could also
become an important policy issue in a 4◦C+ world. It is understood that low-lying
small island states are especially vulnerable to the effects of climate change, and
to sea-level rise and extreme weather events in particular. The sea-level rise that
will be induced by a 4◦C+ temperature change is expected to make some island
states uninhabitable, and their governments might then have no other option than
to organize the resettlement of their population abroad [51]. There are currently
38 small island states that have acquired full independence. Among them, the
existence of at least six states, representing about one million people, would be
directly at risk in the case of a temperature rise of 4◦C+ degrees: Bahamas,
Kiribati, Maldives, Marshall Islands, Nauru and Tuvalu. These island states are
all of very low elevation, with a highest point situated below 100m above sea
level.5 Though adaptation strategies in low-lying island states are usually limited
and costly, they are not necessarily doomed to fail and one should not jump too
quickly to describing islanders as stateless citizens in the making. Indeed, such
rhetoric might just jeopardize the adaptation efforts of these countries [52].
In the event of 4◦C+ world, in some cases migration of the whole population
might become the only viable option. It should be carefully planned and
organized, with the interests of the migrants as paramount, at both the
individual and collective levels. In particular, their political rights, citizenship
and collective identity should be preserved. Some authors have pointed out that
the migrants would in this case fall under the 1961 Convention for the Reduction
of Statelessness, and could avail themselves of the Convention’s protection. An
alternative view is that these migrants should not be considered as stateless
citizens, and that these states continue to exist, even uninhabited. The continued
existence of these states is a guarantee that the citizenship and political rights of
their people be maintained—if they were to disappear as independent states, the
irony would be that the very states that disappear into the sea because of climate
change would also lose their seat at the UN table of negotiations. Furthermore,
even in the case where the islands disappear, territorial waters would continue to
exist and could provide an anchor for these states’ political existence. This would
probably also imply reconceptualizing the notion of citizenship.
5. Conclusion
As Danish physicist Niels Bohr famously put it, ‘prediction is very difﬁcult,
especially about the future’. A 4◦C+ world would bring unprecedented changes
to the environment, likely to affect human mobility in different ways. How human
societies could respond to these changes is highly uncertain, and will depend on a
5Maldives, 2m above sea level; Tuvalu, 5m; Marshall Islands, 10m; Bahamas, 63m; Nauru, 71m
and Kiribati, 81m.




















































wide set of factors, with many of them not relating to environmental conditions.
Despite the lack of explanatory theoretical models, or possibly because of it,
the assessment of how a 4◦C+ world would affect migration patterns remains
dominated by an essentialist, deterministic perspective. This view sees climate-
induced displacement conceptualized as a failure of adaptation, a humanitarian
catastrophe in the making. In this paper, I show how and why such deterministic
assumptions do not match current empirical evidence, and how policy may be
out of touch with the reality of future migration movements. The relationship
between environmental changes and migration is highly complex and depends
upon many variables and speciﬁc contexts. It cannot be reduced to a direct causal
relationship. Thus, the impacts associated with a 4◦C+ warming might not only
affect the magnitude of the induced population movements, but also, and above
all, their very nature.
Among the factors that will also inﬂuence the nature and magnitude of
migration ﬂows, policy is especially important. For now, discussions on future
policy developments in this regard remain rooted in a deterministic perspective,
unlikely to provide an adequate policy framework to address climate-induced
displacements in a warmer world. Both migration and adaptation policies would
need to evolve signiﬁcantly, and move away from the security and humanitarian
agendas they are currently framed in. Climate-induced migration should not
only be addressed within the framework of climate change, but also within the
discussions on the global governance of migration. In many cases, migration does
not have to be envisioned as a humanitarian catastrophe, but can also be a
solution to environmental disruption, which would allow people to relocate in
safer areas and to cope better with climate change impacts.
The author is grateful to the three anonymous reviewers, whose comments have greatly helped him
improve this paper.
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